Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gareth Evans on Self- Identification - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the view is idealistic if it assumes the self-construction of the world through us. On the other hand, the possibility of identifying ourselves as objective persons cannot be exploited verificationistically. >Incorrigibility. I 515 Immunity/Evans: immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification. - But it is not about "identification". - Erorr: to believe that immunity does not extend to physical characteristics. I 518 Self-identification/Evans: logical form: structure: if we consider [I am F] as if it were based on [b is F] and [I am b], then we get into trouble. I 545 Identification/self-identification/I/Evans: identification is based on localization in space. I 557ff Self-identification/SI/Evans: you cannot identify yourself as a "bearer of pain" (circular). - Pain must first be learned through your own experience. - ((s) Correspondingly with other physical experiences: body does not identify the self/I.) Evans: The idea that I associate with my name does not allow self-identification. Self-Identification: is mixed and not decomposable (in physical/mental components). - Otherwise it is circular. It is not absurd that one cannot identify oneself. >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Evans
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Identification
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28